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Psychotherapeutic Treatment
and Malpractice
By DAvm B. SAXE*
I. ITODUCTION
The problems relating to malpractice of psychiatrists and psy-
choanalysts differ in many respects from the malpractice prob-
lems of medical doctors. Psychiatrists deal with the feelings and
emotions of their patients. Their methods and instruments of
treatment, although often similar to those of medical practitioners,
include for the most part exposure through dream analysis, free-
association, and direct discussion of the patients' feelings and
emotions.
In comparison with other medical specialists, psychiatrists are
not often defendants in malpractice cases.' Most of the litigation
involving psychiatrists has resulted from physical injury to a
patient received during the course of treatment. A few recent
cases2 raise the possibility of malpractice liability in the context
of what may be referred to as defective psychotherapeutic or
analytical technique. One of the cases3 involved no physical in-
jury to the patient, but involved instead a deterioration of mental
condition apparently produced by the arousal of deeply-hidden
psychic conflicts.
With the increased availability of psychiatric and psycho-
analytical treatment and its increased acceptance, not only as
therapy but as an intellectual growth process, we may anticipate
an increase in psychiatric malpractice suits before the courts.
*B.A., Columbia College (1963); J.D., Case-Western Reserve University
School of Law (1966); Member of the New York and Ohio Bars.
1 See Bellamy, Malpractice Risks Confronting the Psychiatrist: A Nationwide
Fifteen-Year Study of Appellate Court Cases, 1946 to 1961, 118 AM. J. Psy-
cmATRY 769 (1962); Sandor, The History of Professional Liability Suits in the
United States, 165 J.A.M.A. 459 (1957); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599 (1965).
2 E.g., Hammer v. Rosen 7 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959),
modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
3 Landau v. Werner, 105 SOL. J. 257, on appeal, 105 SOL. J. 1008 (C.A.
1961).
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II. PROBLEMS OF TBEATMENT
A. Chemical Treatment
Chemical procedure for the treatment of psychiatric disorders
involves the use of drugs, and it is anticipated their use will be
greatly increased. Drugs may be utilized as diagnostic aids
(e.g., sodium pentothal), for the treatment of the psychiatric prob-
lem itself (e.g., chlorpromazine or reserpine) or for treating dis-
orders closely connected with the psychiatric problem (e.g.,
antihistamines for treatment of allergies). 4 Generally, any drug
taken on the prescription of the patient's physician or on the
patient's own initiative should be carefully reviewed by the
psychiatrist.
Insulin shock therapy for schizophrenia and other behavioral
abnormalities is a widely accepted chemical treatment.5 The in-
jection places the patient into a coma state of short duration
from which he is brought out by the administration of sugar. It is
thought while the patient has entered into the coma stage, he is
more receptive to effective psychotherapy.
There are certain hazards inherent in shock therapy well
illustrated in the case of Mitchell v. Robinson, a malpractice
action against a physician for convulsive fractures alleged to
have been sustained by the plaintiff while undergoing insulin
therapy for the treatment of emotional illness. The plaintiff, al-
though mentally competent, was suffering from severe schizo-
phrenia accompanied by profound depression and anxiety. The
plaintiff had been told by his physician that the best course of
treatment would combine electroshock and insulin sub-coma
therapy. The general purpose behind electroshock therapy is to
build up the patient's defenses, controls, and self-confidences.
Insulin shock therapy, as noted before, induces a sub-coma state,
but it is neither intended nor desired, as it is with electroshock
therapy, that the patient suffer convulsions. Convulsions some-
times occur, however, and one product of such convulsions is
fractured vertebrae. On his seventh insulin treatment the plaintiff
4 See generally L. WxmriAms, TRIAL OF MEDicAx MArnAc-nc. CASES §
3.10 (1968).
5 See Horowitz, Insulin Shock Therapy, 2 AsmmcANc HNDinoox or Psy-
cHrATRY 1485 (Arieti ed. 1959); Kalinowsky, Convulsive Shock Treatment, 2
AMEmCAN HANDBOOKr OF PsYcHIATRY 1499 (Arieti ed. 1959).
6 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
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had a grand mal seizure which resulted in a compression fracture
of the fifth, sixth and seventh dorsal vertebrae. The main question
before the court was whether the defendant was under a duty
to inform the plaintiff that one of the hazards of insulin treatment
is the fracturing of bones not involved in either the illness or
treatment. The court held that the defendant should have in-
formed the plaintiff of the possible serious collateral risks of
combined electroshock and insulin sub-coma therapy. The
question of whether or not there was a failure to inform was a
submissible fact issue for the jury to decide. The Mitchell case
stands for the proposition that a patient must give an informed
consent before the psychiatrist is protected from malpractice
litigation. A psychiatrist must disclose all risks inherent in the
chemical treatment and a failure to inform may result in
liability.
7
The case of Saron v. State8 is another important decision in the
area of chemical treatment. The patient, a diabetic, entered a
state mental hospital diagnosed as a schizophrenic. He was ad-
ministered the experimental psychiatric drug Isoniazid, called
Compound 100, allegedly in excessive doses causing fatal organic
brain damage. The court found that administration of the drug
did not constitute negligence. There was testimony as to the pos-
sible side effects of Isoniazid, but no definite findings were made.
The contentions of the claimant's intestate regarding the harmful
side effects of Isoniazid were based on an article in a 1952
English journal reporting a single case of the possible harmful
side effects of the drug. The court concluded that the organic
brain damage could have occurred without the use of Compound
100, namely as a result of the patient's diabetes.
Bellandi v. Park Sanitarium Association9 was a wrongful death
action against a hospital and an attending psychiatrist. The
7 There, of course, are instances where full disclosure is not necessary.
Certainly, an emergency situation where the patient is not able to determine or
consent to a course of treatment is a recognized exception. Also, there are those
instances where a disclosure of all risks attendant upon a treatment procedure
may result in alarming an already apprehensive patient who may as a result re-
fuse to undertake surgery or a treatment in which there is a minimal risk or where
such disclosure may result in actually increasing the risk by reason of the
psychological effects of the apprehension itself. See generally Macaulay v. Booth,
58 Cal. App. 2d 757, 128 P.2d 386 (1942); Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe,
58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175 (1954).
8 24 App. Div. 2d 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1965).
9 214 Cal. 472, 6 P.2d 508 (1931).
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decedent, an Italian immigrant, had been planning a trip back
to his native Italy for some time. As the preparations for the
voyage became more numerous, he became overly excited, al-
though not violent. His private doctor diagnosed the case as
acute neurasthenia. He was extremely upset and volatile and was
finally transfered to the Park Sanitarium where the nurse on duty
was informed by his relative that the patient had a remarkable
diffidence to women. He was assigned a room with a male nurse
in charge and was attired in hospital gown. After sleeping for
some time, the patient decided it was time to go home and began
wandering up and down the halls in search of his clothing. He
confronted a female nurse in the hall and demanded his clothing.
When the nurse reached for an emergency bell, the patient
grabbed her hand. At this time Dr. Mulligan was called and a
battle ensued which lasted nearly forty-five minutes. The doctor,
an attendant and six nurses finally subdued the decedent. Straps
and other restraining apparatus commonly used in mental hos-
pitals were available but not used. A choke tourniquet was im-
provised with the aid of a towel and a pound can of ether
was applied to gauze and administered to the patient. A few
minutes after the struggle was over, another doctor observed
the patient and found him dead. The court upheld the jury's
award based on the negligence of the hospital and its personnel
in improperly treating the decedent in view of the fact he was
not violent, but merely excitable with sudden outbursts often
yielding to rest and treatment.
B. Electroshock Treatment
The tort liability problems involving electroshock treatment
are vividly illustrated by the following cases.
Faber v. Olkon'° was an action for damages brought by a
mentally incompetent patient who sustained fractures of both
femur bones while undergoing electroshock therapy. The plaintiff
had been mentally ill for twelve years, suffering from chronic
schizophrenia with hebephrenic-paranoid features with general
progressive mental deterioration. In 1948, a lobotomy was per-
formed by a Dr. Seletz. The history given by Dr. Seletz stated:
10 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 ?.2d 520 (1953).
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[T] hat the patient 'has stereotyped behavior-will not answer
questions. He has no discipline and continues to ramble in his
speech . . . his thoughts are disjointed .... He refuses to
use water to wash with since he states it is too costly. He will
not bathe, and will not use the toilet .... He has had some
eighty shock therapy treatments both in private hospitals and
at Camarillo State Hospital."'
The plaintiff's condition deteriorated and he was referred to the
defendants for shock therapy treatment. The father of the patient
signed a written consent for administration of the therapy. On
September 1, 1948, a second shock treatment was administered,
a day intervening between the first shock treatment because, ac-
cording to the testimony of Dr. Wayne, one of the defendants:
There seems to be evidence of a favorable response, and
ordinarily we have found it good practice to skip a day in
between each treatment . . . to observe the reaction to the
individual treatment .... 12
During the second treatment, five to ten seconds after the current
was applied and while the plaintiff was in a convulsive state, a
snapping or "crunching" sound was heard by the attending
doctors and nurses. The result was a fracture of both femur
bones for which the plaintiff was hospitalized. Following the
fracture, the plaintiffs hip became permanently deformed.
The plaintiff contended that since he was incompetent at the
time of treatment and had no court appointed guardian, the
treatment without his consent constituted an assault as a matter
of law. The court rejected this contention because the father of
the patient had given his written consent. The court also re-
jected the plaintiffs contention that the case should have gone to
the jury on the issue of res ipsa loquitur instead of the verdict
being directed for the defendant.' 3 The court, in rejecting the
res ipsa loquitur contention, distinguished the case of Ybarra v.
Spangar' 4 In Ybarra, the plaintiff, while unconscious on the
operating table, received injuries to healthy parts of his body,
11Id. at--, 254 P.2d at 522.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
1970]
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neither subject to the treatment nor within the area covered by
the operation, from instruments used in the treatment. The
evidence presented in Farber, however, seemed to show that a
certain percentage of fractures will occur regardless of the degree
of precaution or care exercised to prevent it:
[T]he over-all incidence of fractures in shock treatment
varies anywhere from perhaps one-half to about three and a
half per cent. If one considers fractures of the spine . . .
the incidence is between ten and forty per cent.15
The court noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
in malpractice cases only where a layman is able to say as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, or from evidence
can draw an inference, that the consequence of professional
treatment was not such as ordinarily would have followed if due
care had been exercised.' 6 Here, the court found that these
consequences might follow this treatment even if all reasonable
precautions were taken.
The plaintiff had also contended that the defendants were
negligent in failing to restrain him properly during the shock
treatment. This contention was also rejected since it was not
shown that administration of shock therapy with three nurses
present constituted a failure to conform to the applicable standard
of care. Testimony showed that some practitioners felt that a
great deal of restraint was needed, while others believed a lesser
degree of restraint was required. The defendants here, according
to the court, adopted a middle position. 7 The court concluded
that the use of three nurses in the administration of the therapy,
one placed at the extremeties, and the other two at the shoulders,
was in accord with accepted standards of practice. No inference
of negligence could be drawn because the plaintiff's andes were
not restrained.
Another leading case in the general area of negligent electro-
shock therapy is Stone v. Proctor.18 The plaintiff alleged that the
electroshock therapy caused a compressed fracture of his ninth
15 Farber v. Olkin, 40 Cal. 2d 503, -, 254 P.2d 520, 524 (1953).
16 Id.
17Id. at-, 254 P.2d at 526.
18 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963). See also Groce v. Myers, 224 N.C.
165,29 S.E.2d 553 (1944).
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thoracic vertebra. The court held over the objection of the de-
fendant that the question of malpractice was one for jury de-
termination. Apparently this defendant, a Fellow in the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association and familiar with its "standards of
electroshock treatment" prepared by the Committee on Therapy
and approved by the Council of the Association, did not fulfill the
requirements of section "E" which states, "If the patient should
complain of pain or impairment of function, he should receive a
physical examination, including X-rays to ascertain whether he
suffered accidental damage."19
The Stone v. Proctor decision represents a view not fully ac-
cepted by most states: i.e., if a psychiatrist is alleged to have
failed to fulfill accepted published standards for the administering
of electroshock therapy, these standards are material evidence for
submission to a jury.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, considered by the court in
Farber, has been examined by courts in other cases alleging mal-
practice in electroshock therapy. In Johnson v. Rodis,20 the plain-
tiff sustained a fracture during electroshock therapy, and it was
stated that the alleged breach of safety of the treatment ad-
ministered by the physican could be grounds for recovery. The
court held, however, that the negligence count failed since res
ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, ruling that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur did not apply, adopted without quoting, the
reasoning of the trial court. The district court had said:
This doctrine (res ipsa loquitur) is, however, generally re-
stricted to cases of injuries inflicted by a mechanical appara-
tus or some other inanimate object within the defendant's ex-
clusive control. It does not ordinarily apply to cases of injuries
caused by the careless act or thoughtless omission of a human
being. It follows, hence that there is no sound basis for ex-
tending it to actions for negligence against a member of a
learned profession. To do otherwise would practically re-
quire him to guarantee success in every case. Such a course
would be contrary to the principles of fairness to the profes-
19 AmzacAN PsYcIuT AssocIAnoN, STAAws OF ELEcTRosHoCK TEAT-
MENT § E (1953).
20251 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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sions and against the best interests of the public. It would cast
an undue burden on the medical profession and might place
every doctor on the defensive against any disgruntled patient
whom he has failed to cure. Consequently, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked in an action for mal-
practice against a physician or surgeon.
21
In Quinley v. Cooke,2" the court rejected the res ipsa loquitur
contention because fractures are part of the "calculated risk of the
treatment."
23
Currently, most psychiatrists utilizing electroshock therapy
first administer a sedative 2 4 to the patient and then a depressant-
paralyzing drug. 5 Both drugs are administered intravenously
prior to the administration of the electrical shock. The combined
effects of the two drugs are almost complete elimination of
fractures through the reduction in convulsions and muscle con-
traction. The use of such procedures in electroshock therapy
should virtually eliminate malpractice litigation in this area. For
those not using such precautions, malpractice litigation would
seem to be almost a certainty if injuries occur, but the number of
physicians failing to use available precautions will certainly be
minimal at best.
With the use of these drug precautions in electroshock
therapy, malpractice litigation in this area will most probably be
strictly limited to those instances in which such precautions were
not carefully observed.
C. Defective Analytical Technique
This sub-section deals with the legal problems that might arise
in psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytical relationships. Normally,
analytical therapy is conducted without the added feature of
mechanical or chemical agents, although in some instances,
electroshock therapy will enable the psychiatrist to aid the patient
in discovering new and valuable insights that may ameliorate the
patient's emotional difficulties. Our discussion will focus on the
one-to-one relationship that normally exists in analytical work
21 151 F. Supp. 345, 347 (D.D.C. 1957).
22 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).
23 Id. at 439, 192 S.W.2d at 996-97.
24 The sedative generally used is a curare-like drug, e.g., suicinyleholine.
2
5 I.e. pentothal (a short-acting barbituate).
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and which may in the future give rise to legal problems for
the psychiatrist.
Effective psychoanalytical treatment depends to a great de-
gree on the relationship between the analyst and the patient, to
which the patient can bring past emotions and experiences in
order to develop more emotionally mature standards for dealing
with his present environmental situation. This phenomenon of
transference is important in the technique of psychoanalysis:
It (transference) is the automatic tendency of the patient to
transfer to the analyst feelings which he has had in his child-
hood years toward important figures in his environment,
particularly his parents. For instance, the man who comes
from a home where his father was a brutal, sadistic, de-
manding person is stirred from early childhood to rebellion
against this type of treatment . . . .Soon in the analytic
situation he becomes rebellious toward the analyst, finding all
sorts of faults with the treatment situation, feeling the
analyst is unkind to him and even resentful of him. Thus he
transfers hostile feelings of the type that he originally had
toward his father to the analyst and accuses the latter of the
same unfair, cruel treatment as he has suffered at the hands
of his father. Meantime, of course, the analyst's attitude re-
mains friendly and understanding so that eventually the
patient can be helped to see the unreality in his feelings and
behavior. Previously in his life when he has become hostile
to authoritarian figures they have reacted with hostility to-
ward him, which in turn has prevented him from recognizing
his original neurotic reaction. However, in the treatment
situations he has the opportunity to trace the pattern back
to its origin and develop a more mature solution.26
The phenomenon of transference is affected by the so-called
"countertransference" 27 which refers to the emotional responses of
the psychiatrist during the course of treatment. The psychiatrist
who understands his own motivations and needs will best be
able to serve his patient's emotional needs. Conversely, the psy-
chiatrist with little or faulty understanding of his own personality
260. ENGLISH AND S. FiNcH, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY 551 (1954).
271,d. at 555. See also Balint, On the Transference and Countertransference,
20 INT'. J. PsYcHo-ANALYsis 223 (1939); Berman, Countertransference and At-
titudes of the Analyst in the Therapeutic Process, 12 PsYcHIATRY 159 (1949).
1970]
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will interfere with and possibly lessen the effectiveness of his
patient's treatment. Psychiatric practitioners are not required by
law to have undergone successful psychoanalysis themselves so
that their actions and drives are free from neurotic motivation.
Yet the psychiatrist should have some degree of insight into his
own motivations in order to control the countertransference. The
interest being served in the analytical setting is the patient's
emotional well-being and that interest may be impeded by a lack
of insight by the psychiatrist into his own unconscious motiva-
tions."' In analyzing analytical malpractice litigation, the degree
of skill exercised by the psychiatrist in controlling and under-
standing the countertransference should be a measuring stick
for a malpractice defense. As one writer has stated:
The question in each case should be whether the doctor has
taken undue advantage of the relationship for the pursuit of
personal gain; whether he has demonstrated a control of
his own motives which falls below the standard of the rele-
vant psychiatric community, not alone whether his treatment
was an expression of his unconscious hostility toward the
patient.29
The boundaries of psychiatric-patient involvement have
been explored in relatively few cases and have never been de-
fined. Landau v. Werner"0 was a successful malpractice action
brought against a psychiatrist who began a social relationship
with a patient who had "fallen in love" with him. The plaintiff
had been referred to the psychiatrist in a highly emotional and
nervous condition in March, 1949. He treated her by "transfer-
ence" and after twenty-four sessions, the plaintiff had become
28 See generally S. FREui, The Dynamics of the Transference, 2 CoL.-cram
PAPms 312 (1912); S. Fntmm, Further Recommendations in the Technique of
Psychoanalysis: Observation on Transference-Love, 2 CoLLECrm PAPERs 377
(1915).
29 Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 Du L.J. 696, 711. A
considerable number of malpractice suits stem from faulty doctor-patient re-
lationships, and from feelings of resentment which the patient develops toward
the physician. Mr. Dawidoff qiens the duty of the psychiatrist to a patient to that
of a fiduciary to his beneficiary. Id. at 702-03. See also Heller, Some Comments to
Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401 (1957). See especially
Shankor, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Com-
munication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REV. 5 (1965). New theories are often pigeon-
holed into safe areas of law, a common but unfortunate aspect of legal thinking.
0105 SOL. J. 257, on appeal, 105 SoL. J. 1008 (C.A. 1961).
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sexually and emotionally aroused by the intimate conversation
with the defendant. She discussed these feelings with the de-
fendant and her shame about them. The defendant advised her
to continue with the therapy and assured her that the feelings
of love and attachment would cease. The plaintiff, in August,
1949, contemplated the ending of the relationship, but the
defendant thought that the plaintiff was not wholly recovered
and, fearing a relapse to her former anxiety state, he advised
against discontinuing the relationship. Instead, he began a series
of social visits with the plaintiff outside his office. They visited
restaurants together, rode in taxicabs, spoke of a vacation to-
gether and on one occasion visited the plaintiff's sitting room.
The defendant never made any improper advances. The plaintiff
failed to recover and as a probable consequence of these further
visits experienced a setback in her progress. The treatment re-
sumed in March, 1950, with electroshock therapy, but this did
not produce any change. In April, 1951, the plaintiff attempted
suicide. The psychiatrist made one final unsuccessful attempt with
therapy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Queen's Bench ver-
dict for the plaintiff holding that a good cause of action in
negligence was made out by the testimony of other physicians
condemning social visits in the course of treatment by a psy-
chiatrist of a patient who is aroused towards him by transference
and which are the probable cause for a serious decline in condi-
tion from an improved level.
Hammer v. Rosen3 ' deals with a somewhat unorthodox method
of psychiatric treatment, but does not involve the faulty handling
of the countertransference. The plaintiff, a schizophrenic, be-
came the patient of the defendant after having undergone over
one hundred and fifty electroshock treatments with another
therapist. Applying a therapy that he labeled "direct psycho-
analysis,"3 2 Dr. Rosen's treatment allegedly included physical
317 App. Div. 2d 216, 181 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1959), modified, 7 N.Y.2d 376,
165 N.E.2d 756, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
32 See generally J. ROSEN, DmECT PsYcnoANAL~imc PsYCmATRY (1961); J.
Rosen, A Method of Resolving Acute Catatonic Excitement, 20 Psyc. Q. XI
(1946), describing Rosens efforts to apply Freudian techniques to psychotic
patients. "The governing principle of direct psychoanalysis [is] that the psy-
chiatrist shall be, in effect, a foster-parent to the psychotic individual who has
regressed to infancy, and who must be brought up all over again." See Stone,
Two Avenues of Approach to the Schizophrenic Patient, 3 J. AM. PsYciaOANAL=c
Assoc. 126 (1955).
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beatings of his patients. Some initial improvement in the plain-
tiffs condition occurred, but after seven years of treatment, the
initial improvement did not last, a phenomenon of "complex
causation." The Court of Appeals held inter alia that the trial
court erred in dismissing a cause of action for malpractice. The
court held that expert testimony of malpractice was not necessary
where "the very nature of the acts complained of bespeaks mal-
practice;"33 and consequently, the testimony of three witnesses
to the alleged assaults made out a prima facie case.
The professional guidelines adhered to by the court in Landau
are that a psychiatrist fulfills his duty when the method of
therapy he employs is accepted by his profession. Nevertheless,
the psychiatrist should not be found negligent solely on the
ground that the treatment was unsuccessful or that it was con-
trary to a majority viewpoint among physicians. As long as the
treatment he pursues is recognized to some degree in the profes-
sion, the psychiatrist need not strictly adhere to "standard pro-
cedures." Yet, the Court of Appeals in Landau felt that the course
which the defendant should have followed upon discovering that
his patient had fallen in love with him was to abandon the
therapy rather than to encourage social visits. The court's incli-
nation appears psychiatrically unsound. The occurrence of the
feelings experienced by the plaintiff was certainly not the point
at which the relationship should have been terminated. The in-
tensity of Miss Landau's feelings probably pointed to analytical
success and to a beginning of insight on the part of the patient.
Once the repressed feelings of childhood are liberated, the patient
may emotionally examine such feelings which gave rise to the
psychic conflicts that are the roots of anxiety states. The emotional
learning that follows the re-examination and liberation of such
feelings is the core of psychotherapy. The court in Landau could
not countenance the defendant's social visits as a therapeutic
solution to the plaintiff's dependency problems. Termination of
the relationship, rather than the continued but somewhat in-
novative and less frequent therapy of Dr. Werner was the correct
procedure to be followed.
33 Landau v. Werner, 105 SOL. J. 257, -, on appeal, 105 SOL. J. 1008, (CA.
1961).
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Hammer v. Rosen and Landau v. Werner reflect the uneasy
attitude concerning psychiatric methodology that afflicts courts
unfamiliar with the dynamic strides taken in the development of
modem psychiatric techniques. Both are unfortunate decisions.
Hammer v. Rosen, although conventionally incorporating the
traditional law of assault and battery into a psychiatric mal-
practice situation, refused to view or comprehend this type of
treatment in its proper perspective, thereby undermining the
trust existing between the legal and psychiatric professions. Lan-
dau v. Werner reflects the legal attitude of discomfort with in-
novative psychiatric-medical procedure. Here, unlike the Hammer
v. Rosen situation, there was no battery, but instead an unsuc-
cessful attempt to deal with a patient's emotional problems cul-
minating in an abortive suicide attempt by the patient. A psy-
chiatrist should be responsible for controlling the countertrans-
ference toward the patient, although defining and proving the
relevant standards of control will be difficult. Moreover, the
failure to control the countertransference must be the causative
factor in the plaintiff's emotional decline. The difficulty here
begins not so much with the degree to which the therapist con-
trols and understands his own feelings of anger and hostility to-
ward the patient as it does with the court's disinclination to ac-
cept the notion that successful analytical work often encounters
serious setbacks and barriers in the form of psychic resistances.
Often the patient in the progress of incorporating new levels of
independence and ego strengths may have a temporary loss in
the form of a psychotic episode when emotionally charged areas
are explored. This factor deserves keen attention by a court,
especially when a patient, unhappy by the necessarily slow and
often tortuous path of therapy, decides to terminate the relation-
ship and initiate litigation. Will a court be justified in fixing
liability when the patient falls below the pre-therapy level of his
condition? Is this point the base-line for the determination of
damages? Although case-by-case evaluation is necessary, even
declines from a pre-therapy level may be therapeutically un-
changeable due to the necessity of uncovering layers of resistance
erected by the patient prior to therapy. Therefore, it seems neces-
sary to require more than a mere breach of duty when a patient
fails to improve or even suffers some decline in progress.
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D. Tort Liability for Suicide
The rule of law applicable to suicides committed in hospitals
and other institutions requires that where suicidal tendencies are
known to exist, reasonable care must be taken to protect the
possible victim from himself. The most important single factor
to consider in determining whether a hospital or physician is
negligent in failing to prevent the suicide of a patient is whether
the hospital authorities, under the circumstances, could reason-
ably have anticipated that the patient might harm himself. The
hospital through its attending staff is under a positive duty to
use reasonable care to protect the patient from a known or
reasonably-apprehended danger of suicide.34
The basic issue involved in all the cases dealing with tort
liability for a patient's suicide is the forseeability or predictability
of the suicide. Certain difficulties are encountered when con-
sidering the implications of forseeability. Statistical complications
do not often reflect the true incidence of suicide because of a
variety of social and medical factors, including the difficulty of
detection or identification and the social opprobrium often at-
tached to suicide.35 The notion that suicide is predictable in a
majority of cases is often fallacious. It is well known that an
individual can commit suicide despite most precautions. Clothing,
cutlery, glass and other sharp objects, access to heights or
vehicles, all can provide the mode of self-destruction. As one
leading lay science writer has pointed out:
In any given case, the psychiatrist deals with the possibilities
of a remote and unpredictable but ever-present nature. He
never deals with probabilities-only possibilities of unmeasur-
able degrees. Unlike the situation elsewhere where a disaster
occurs because of an act by the physician-for example,
leaving scissors in the abdomen during surgery, here the
disaster arises from the act of the individual patient. Not
only can the disaster not be accurately anticipated, but the
patient himself changes from day to day, week to week, and
month to month.36
34 Perr, Liability of Hospital and Psychiatrist in Suicide, 122 Ai. J. Psy-
cHATRY 431 (1965). See generally U.S. v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1952); Tissinger v. Woolley, 78 Ga. App. 18, 50 S.E.2d 122 (1948); Noel v.
Menninger Foundation, 180 Kan. 23, 299 P.2d 38 (1956).3 5 Perr, supra note 34, at 431.
36Id. at 438.
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We must accept the fact that suicide is a problem characterized
by marked limitation in predictability and prevention, not only
in hospitals but throughout our society. It is quite clear that the
hospital aspect represents only a single element. Hopefully, courts
will not feel shackled by past decisions which proclaim the wis-
dom of close observation and strict patient surveillance. Current
trends in psychiatry clearly show that these psychiatric methods
are not effective in rehabilitating patients and enabling them to
return to a normal life. The "open-door" technique whereby
patients are encouraged to resume a normal existence, the in-
creased liberal trends in psychiatric hospitals and the unforesee-
ability of suicide in many instances should provide guidelines for
judges and juries so that judicial decisions in this area may re-
flect the trends and developments of modern dynamic psychiatry.
This does not mean that plaintiffs' verdicts are too frequent.
Certainly there are numerous instances where the warning was
clear and the precautions inadequate or nonexistance. 37 Further-
more, a faulty handling of the countertransference as a result of
the therapist's hostility or anxiety toward the patient may cry-
stallize feelings of rejection and depression within an already
concerned patient.
III. CONCLUSION
The psychiatrist may appear as defendant in cases alleging
wrongful commitment to an institution, false imprisonment,
malicious persecution or improper disclosure of privileged com-
munications. These situations are not covered here because they
do not deal primarily with areas of psychiatric treatment.
The responsibility of the psychotherapist to his patient will be
established under the usual test of malpractice liability, i.e.
whether the physician departed significantly from the profes-
sional standards of other physicians conducting a similar practice
in the same geographical area. But these standards of malpractice
must incorporate knowledge of relevant psychiatric standards
regarding countertransference so that emerging litigation in the
area of analytical technique may be decided properly.
37 See, e.g., Lexington Hospital, Inc. v. White, 245 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1952).
